

thinking

togetherness

ANDREJ BOŽIČ (*Ed.*)

**THINKING TOGETHERNESS**

**PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIALITY**

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The scientific monograph is published as part of the effectuation of the research program *The Humanities and the Sense of Humanity from Historical and Contemporary Viewpoints* (P6-0341), the research project *The Hermeneutic Problem of the Understanding of Human Existence and Coexistence in the Epoch of Nihilism* (J7-4631), and the infrastructure program *Center for the Promotion of the Humanities* (I0-0036).

The publication of the book is financially supported by the Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency (ARIS).

CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji  
Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana

165.62:316(082)

THINKING togetherness : phenomenology and sociality / Andrej Božič (ed.). -  
Ljubljana : Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities, 2023. - (Humanistična zbirka  
INR = The Humanities Series INR)

ISBN 978-961-7014-40-2  
COBISS.SI-ID 172262659

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PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIALITY

**INR** | INSTITUTE NOVA REVUJA  
FOR THE HUMANITIES

Ljubljana 2023

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dean Komel — Andrej Božič <b>Thinking Togetherness. Foreword</b>	9
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## PRESUPPOSITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Dragan Prole <b>Sociality in the Husserlian Cave</b>	15
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Iaan Reynolds <b>Abstraction and Self-Alienation in Mannheim and Husserl</b>	31
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Filip Borek <b><i>Schwingung</i> at the Heart of Phenomenon. Intersubjectivity and Phenomenality</b>	45
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## TRANSCENDENTALITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Zixuan Liu <b>What Is the Irreality of Social Reality? Higher Visibility Transcendental Intentionality</b>	63
---	----

Noam Cohen <b>Subjectivity as a Plurality. Parts and Wholes in Husserl's Theory of Intersubjectivity</b>	89
---	----

Anthony Longo <b>Intersubjectivity, Mirror Neurons, and the Limits of Naturalism</b>	103
---	-----

Ka-yu Hui <b>The Expressive Structure of the Person in Husserl's Social Phenomenology. From Subjective Spirit to Cultural Spiritual Shape</b>	117
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## DEVELOPMENTS AND REFINEMENTS

Liana Kryshevskaja	
<b>The Notion of the Social World in Gustav Shpet's Conceptualization and the Ways of Phenomenology</b>	131
Daniele Nuccilli	
<b>Wilhelm Schapp on the Narratological Structure of Intersubjectivity</b>	143
Daniel Neumann	
<b>Sharing a Realistic Future. Gerda Walther on Sociality</b>	157
Jan Strassheim	
<b>"Passive" and "Active" Modes of Openness to the Other. Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity</b>	169
Andrzej Gniazdowski	
<b>Phenomenology of the Total State by Aurel Kolnai</b>	183
Max Schaefer	
<b>Renewing the Erotic Relation. Michel Henry and the Lover's Night</b>	205

## COLLECTIVITY AND COMMUNITY

Marco di Feo	
<b>The Ontological Root of Collective Intentionality</b>	227
Lucia Angelino	
<b>Sartre and Freud as Resources for Thinking the Genesis of a We-Perspective</b>	241
Marco Russo	
<b>The Theater of Appearances. Social Phenomenology of Excentricity</b>	255
Nerijus Stasiulis	
<b>The Ontology of Sociality</b>	269
Dario Vuger	
<b>On Circumlocution as Method. From Heidegger and Debord Towards a Philosophical Praxis</b>	279
Silvia Pierosara	
<b>Managing the Absent. On the Role of Nostalgia in Individual and Social Relations</b>	299

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PARTICULARITIES AND TOTALITARITIES

Michal Zvarík	
<b>Socrates and <i>Polis</i> in the Thought of Jan Patočka and Hannah Arendt</b>	313
Zachary Daus	
<b>On the Significance of Mutual Vulnerability in Hannah Arendt's Conception of Freedom</b>	327
Fabián Portillo Palma	
<b>Isolation and Loneliness as Categories of Social Being. Arendt and the Origin of Totalitarian Movements</b>	339
Gintautas Mažeikis	
<b>Faustian Hope and Power. Bataille, Bloch, Habermas</b>	351
Guelfo Carbone	
<b>A Way Out of Nazism? Heidegger and the "Shepherd of Being"</b>	365
Dean Komel	
<b>On Totalitarium</b>	381

7

INDIVIDUALITY AND EXPRESSIVITY

Evgeniya Shestova	
<b>Communication in the Text Space. Phenomenology of the "Logic of Question and Answer"</b>	401
Manca Erzetič	
<b>The Hermeneutics of Testimony in the Context of Social Mediation</b>	413
Andrej Božič	
<b>"Mitsammen." Paul Celan's Poetry in the "In-Between" of (Cultural) World(s)</b>	427
Antonia Veitschegger	
<b>Disagreement about an Art Work's Value. Why It Is Unavoidable, What It Consists In, and How to Deal With It</b>	443

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TECHNOLOGIES AND CONTROVERSIES

Joaquim Braga	
<b>On Don Ihde's Concept of Technological Background Relations</b>	459
Žarko Paić	
<b>The Body and the Technosphere. Beyond Phenomenology and Its Conceptual Matrix</b>	475
Paolo Furia	
<b>Uncanniness and Spatial Experience. A Phenomenological Reading of the COVID-19 Lockdown</b>	511
AUTHORS	533
INDEX OF NAMES	539

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Dragan Prole

## SOCIALITY IN THE HUSSERLIAN CAVE

*Abstract:* Husserl's philosopher leaves the cave by, paradoxically, remaining in it, but no longer shares the beliefs of his silent, inactive neighbors. Unlike their attachment, the phenomenological inhabitant of the cave will reflect the degree of the justification of his beliefs, but at the same time he will come out of his individuality, varying his individual ego in accordance with various variations of himself that open with the temptation of otherness. In order to get rid of the cave limitations, it is not necessary to leave the cave ambience. It is enough to change our attitude. Husserl's idea of sociality examines the intersubjective constitution of the subject, including theories of strangeness and otherness. If we come to our senses, let us be convinced that the experience of a foreigner has already done its job. The rationality of phenomenological politics becomes detectable by recognizing others in oneself. Its peaceful assumption rests in recognizing others, even strangers, as variations of myself. The capacity to acquire enemies is largely neutralized by such an approach.

*Keywords:* Husserl, Plato, cave, sociality, natural socialization, enemy, alien.

### **A new awakening of humanity**

The standard key to understanding Husserl's phenomenology emphasizes its logical and methodological contribution. The political issues were not very much in the phenomenological spotlight. A favorite general stance concerned the discussion of *pro et contra* of the possibility of philosophy to become a strict science, the leading science of all sciences, *mathesis universalis*. "Political reasons" remained in the background, and in the eyes of Husserl politics was considered, which is especially recognizable in his correspondence, as a distant and remote scene of power. What was linked with madness and lacking in *ethos* could certainly not have been ranked higher than "strictly scientific reasons": "Madness rules the whole world, but it has a different flag in every

country.” (Husserl 1994, 87.) Husserl’s phenomenology has been traditionally interpreted by both his admirers and his opponents as being restrained in the matters of politics; this is evidenced by the fact that of all individual philosophical disciplines the most insignificant phenomenological production took place in the field of political philosophy. Moreover, little by little, the attitude that: “The phenomenological school (in which Heidegger was active as Husserl’s assistant) was not interested in politics. This is a fact” (Janicaud 1990, 20), became almost self-evident.

16 Truth be told, most of Husserl’s published books and articles fit in perfectly with such a picture, as they very rarely mention the notion of politics. If we summarize the basic program and conceptual sketches, we will notice that the topics of phenomenology are primarily related to the concept of science, to the radical reform and renewal of knowledge, and not to politics. However, following a specific trace of phenomenological idealism, it is possible to sense a significant kinship between phenomenology and politics. The search for a new science is political, insofar as it implies *a new awakening of humanity*. Husserl’s notion of science is by no means limited to theoretical work. When science and rationality come under the scrutiny of phenomenological reduction, traditional disciplinary divisions are erased. This becomes a type of science that is both logical and political, simultaneously ethical and historical.

By its origin, this type of science belongs to classical antiquity, and is therefore necessarily “conservative.” With Husserl, as with Nietzsche, the equation, by which philosophy “justifies” the philosopher, remains in force. On the other hand, life, the very life of a philosopher, is the ultimate “courtroom,” in which the validity of philosophy is judged. In short, idealism in its purest form seeks the realization of an idea in the life of a philosopher. The separation of the philosophical goal and the life goal is not justified. The purpose of philosophy must simply not be alien to the efforts of human life, because otherwise both life and philosophy suffer. Thus, for example, at the beginning of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl repeats three times the enormous merit of Descartes, that is, his “eternal significance” (Husserl 1960, 1, 4). In a solemn tone, he attributes a classic status to *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, in other words, their immunity to historical changes. However, he also states that, despite “eternity,” it has become questionable whether these thoughts can provide a suitable

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stimulus to the “vital forces of the present.” Despite previous praise, Husserl’s objections to Descartes are sometimes surprisingly harsh and ruthless. Husserl observes historical heritage from a certain distance, he is not interested in an antique collection of philosophical ideas of the past. Tradition is interesting to him only as a contribution to a philosophy that has yet to emerge, and it is always oriented towards an original stimulus. That stimulus was genuinely Plato’s. When we mention Husserl’s “conservative” science, we primarily think that its leading motives are like Plato’s, for whom politics was also not placed on the opposite side of the notion of science.

For both Plato and Husserl, there is an equality, according to which the form of political life of a community is directly dependent on the degree of rationality that has been achieved in it. Although Husserl’s idea of theory is ancient in its origin, its realization is extremely contemporary. Claiming that it harmonizes Plato’s legacy with current requirements, we primarily aim at cultivating the sensibility to meet new and unexperienced aspects of the phenomenon: “phenomenological reduction is unthinkable without a subject capable of receiving the givenness of phenomena that this reduction makes manifest for the first time” (Bernet 1994, 245). Novelty is a key methodological criterion: if only the familiar and already known appear during reflection, the reduction was not carried out in an appropriate manner. Cognition is not based on memory anymore, but on methodologically prepared openness to the unexperienced and still unreflected. Phenomenology is not just about intimate experiences and private subjectivity. Reduction not only opens the door to new possibilities of individual subjectivity, but also points to new possibilities of socialization.

What is rationality for Husserl, what is science? Unlike the everyday view, which may or may not be true, the scientific one is one that meets the criteria of the absolute rendering of accounts. Only the individual who has fully elaborated his views can practically act completely responsibly, while partially explained knowledge necessarily results in confusion, inconsistency, and misunderstanding. Husserl’s scientific rigor implies the final self-responsibility of phenomenologists. Any idea of theoretical autonomy is meaningless, the key is in the active mind capable of not stopping halfway to see all the perspectives and genetic aspects of the phenomenon it is researching.

The only relevant thought is the one that stimulates vital forces, that strengthens us, encourages us, directs us to share responsibly. This is the germ of the political responsibility of philosophy. The responsibility of contemporary philosophers lies in the requirement to adapt or, better, to “translate” the classics into the current context so that their thought is as effective as possible in the ongoing moment. In this spirit, Husserl calls his phenomenology “new,” on the one hand, but at the same time abandons the old-fashioned, “twentieth-century Cartesianism,” on the other. In order to provide something new, the phenomenologist remains grey-haired.

If philosophical tradition also knows the legacy of thoughts that are not a matter of the moment, are not temporary and time-limited, but are eternally valid, it is necessary to establish a connection between the eternal and the temporal. By itself, such a connection does not exist. To be a contemporary philosopher means to mediate heterogeneous registers of temporality with thought. The impassable should be approached in such a way as to ensure its effect in the current. It is worthwhile to make the best of the tradition modified in such a way as to help it act as a stimulus to modern life.

18

### **Husserl’s capability of a political fight**

Disharmonious, tired times cannot cope with their own problems, and that is exactly how Husserl saw the interwar period. When he looked at the European emergency, the troubles did not have its final reason in the political, but in the scientific address. According to him, the origin of the crisis could not be linked to the lack of will for far-reaching political dialogue. It was pointless to look for it in the unequal position of Germany suffering from huge inflation and unemployment after the *Versailles Peace Treaty*. The emergence of increasingly radical political ideologies was interpreted only as a second-class surrogate and consequence, rather than the origin and source of contemporary challenges. The real reason for concern was the lack of a strict rational common thread. Only a single, methodologically disciplined thought, systematically connected with other thoughts, can offer a basis for a stable political life. The confusion of unrelated thoughts in political reality causes uncontrolled clashes of different ideologies, which crash against each other as unstoppable natural elements.

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Under such circumstances, “Husserl returns to his homeland to attack none other than naturalists (*Naturforscher*), proving that he has become capable of political fight” (Vlaisavljević 2013, 21). The struggle for scientific policy contains the key to shaping contemporary subjectivity. It contains a vague landmark for everything that society wants to achieve, a label for what it essentially cares about.

The unspoken premise of Husserl’s phenomenology was that philosophy was more politically necessary than ever. The motivation is clear: *scientific policy is indisputably crucial*, presuming there does not exist a more competent judge on the question of the justification of certain types of science than philosophy. Thus, for example, naturalism is the leading scientific paradigm, in spite of it being philosophically completely meaningless and illegitimate. Its strength stems from its closeness to the dominant pursuit of exact science, but:

naturalism dominates the age [...] in a form that from the ground up is replete with erroneous theory; and from the practical point of view this means a growing danger for our culture. It is important today to engage in a radical criticism of [...] the absurd consequences of a naturalism built on strict empirical science. (Husserl 1965, 78.)

19

The rule of empirical demands hands naturalism over to relativism, and by doing so to political manipulation. Hence, it is not surprising that the discomfort in contemporaneity did not rest in the lack of ideas, but rather in their excess. Instead of a philosophy capable of offering support for responsible action, the main phrase on the public stage was the so-called “philosophical literature,” an ideologically unrelated set of heterogeneous philosophical thoughts that “grows indefinitely,” but does not offer any support to the zeal of life. Due to its principled fragmentation and incoherence, it rather brings unrest. In short, rationality, which should be the guide of human life, both on the individual and the collective, political level, in reality brings confusion, disagreement, lack of common ground. Husserl turns out to be an old-fashioned thinker even when he claims that only in systematic unity can philosophy reach true rationality. Where there is no systemic whole, there is no truly rational thinking or acting. It seems that philosophers have given up their vocation to be “specialists in

generality” and that the spirit of specialization poses the greatest threat to both the scientific and political impact of philosophical thought. The trouble with the spirit of scientific specialization is that it gets the guidelines of its work from the outside. If the leading idea of science is not the responsibility of scientists, then it is a matter of agreeing to heteronomy. Paradoxically, phenomenology acquires its political relevance by successfully demonstrating the capacity to turn its back on social influences (Berger 1964, 146). To be a phenomenologist means to come to yourself, to regain yourself from being lost in the world. Husserl is convinced that one is lost, literally every one of us who knows nothing about creative subjectivity.

20 Husserl’s cave man has no contact with the source and origin of his consciousness, i.e., himself. When he wants to change that, he is forced to stop, abstain, interrupt, and start again. When he puts the *epoché* into operation, Husserl presents himself to us as a thinker of radical contemporaneity. Phenomenology is inconceivable without time sections, without cuts, without discontinuities in relation to the reason of the natural attitude. The *epoché* names different types of withdrawal or rethinking, both at the level of asking questions and changing attitudes. To be a contemporary philosopher, first, means to change oneself by recognizing and breaking down one’s own naïveté (Eley 1962, 65). Almost all terms from the semantic register of the *epoché* were extremely well received in contemporary philosophy, especially among those who never had a nice word for Husserl, such as the students of Jean Hyppolite, like Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. Admittedly, there is no mention of the *epoché* among them, but that is why there are all the nuances that this term covers: cut, gap, breach, discontinuity, change, time slice.

Husserl’s captive in the cave is unimaginably chained. Despite all similarities in the inherent philosophical goals, the status of sensuality in Plato and Husserl is incomparable. There is no talk of static observation, there is no scene of the human body fixed to the ground, chained around the neck and thighs. Movement and perception go hand in hand, bodily movement is not external, but is immanent to thinking: “the kinesthesias pertaining to the organs flow in the mode ‘I am doing,’ and are subject to my ‘I can’; furthermore, by calling these kinesthesias into play, I can push, thrust, and so forth, and can thereby

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‘act’ somatically immediately, and then mediately“ (Husserl 1960, 97). In addition to the fact that Husserl’s sensuality and corporeality are not shackled, there is also the intentional nature of consciousness that is tireless, and cannot be satisfied with permanent faith in unexplored scenes.

### **When one of them is liberated ...**

Despite the sufficiently detailed anthropological scene, unambiguous metaphors, Plato still does not show how one comes to the epistemological turn, to become a philosopher. Following Kant’s teaching in practical reason, there is no theory of liberty; only consecutive steps in personal liberation could have illustrated freedom. Nevertheless, the neuralgic weakness of the cave allegory lies in the hypothesis: “when one would be freed” (515c), while it remains unclear how the shackles are removed and even more, what motivated some individuals to abandon the comfort of their genuine situation. It is only clear that they are individuals. Seduction can be collective, sophists and poetic demagogues are conceivable as seducers of the masses, but group, collective emancipation is not conceivable for Plato. This lesson is one of the classics of political philosophy: a common totalitarian psychosis is conceivable, but a guide to collective freedom is not possible. For Plato, the path of redemption remains in the pedagogical relations of teachers and students. Namely, it is quite certain that the process of leaving the cave is difficult and arduous, and that a successful exit requires help of another, more experienced “climber,” who has already been lucky enough to successfully leave the cave.

In order to get out of the cave, Husserl’s phenomenologist must first change their mind. At the same time, physical removal is not necessary at all. *A phenomenologist can come out of the cave by, paradoxically, still remaining in it.* Instead of remaining fascinated by what appears to them, it is enough to reflect on their experiences to understand that appearance is always necessarily subjective. The phenomenologist understands consciousness as intentional, which, in other words, means that they remain eternally dissatisfied with what simply appears. To be a phenomenologist means to be impatient and annoyed with what is presented and seemingly self-evident. Horizontal intentionality simply drives embodied consciousness to look from the other side, to illuminate

various possibilities of emergence, to examine possible statuses and various forms of modification. In such conditions, the shadows have no chance to hide that they are, indeed, shadows. At the same time, it turns out that the ego is not an immutable substance, but a stream of consciousness, a subject that flows through time. When they realize that transcendental subjectivity is not tied to the existing one, and notice that they can practice different kinds of attitudes they usually do, the phenomenologist is ready to face the cave existence:

What is educational in the phenomenological reduction, however, is also this: it henceforth makes us in general sensitive toward grasping other attitudes, whose rank is equal to that of the natural attitude (or, as we can now say more clearly, the nature-attitude) and which therefore, just like the latter, constitute only relative and restricted correlates of being and sense. (Husserl 1989b, 189.)

22 In this “educational” line of reduction lies Husserl’s advantage—the only way Plato can lobby for a change of attitude is to tell the natural consciousness a story (*mythos*) about the possibilities of change. On the other hand, Husserl is able to clarify in detail the methodological steps that need to be taken so that the change towards the natural attitude really happens. Now, it is only a matter of the phenomenologist’s making sure that the neighboring inhabitants of the cave become “sensitive towards grasping other attitudes.” But, if a definite parting of the phenomenologist and the cave would be possible, it would, on the one hand, mark a complete success of reduction and the triumph of the methodology of “beginners,” which ensures fortunate and permanent entry into a completely different world. Furthermore, Plato’s request that “one must try to escape from here to there as quickly as possible” (*Theaetetus* 176a) (Plato 2015, 47) would imply a completely different society, in which the rules, norms, and customs of natural attitude no longer apply. However, Zagorka Mičić, a few years before Merleau-Ponty, sees insurmountable difficulties in the “total” implementation of reduction. They occur primarily because the phenomenologist constantly must fight with oneself, that is, with all those insights and beliefs that came to be in the natural attitude.

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To be a phenomenologist, in other words, means to swim upstream:

In every description we must beware of knowledge from the natural attitude, which in fact is constantly imposed on us as already known and native-born [...] we must constantly fight with the current that pulls us in the opposite direction. Therefore, phenomenological examination means not only work, but also struggle. (Mičić 1937, 151.)

Furthermore, a phenomenologist cannot only count on the company of like-minded people. Being-with-others always delivers them into the lap of the natural attitude. If there is no complete reduction, the question arises, whether a philosopher can remain in the cave without ceasing to be a philosopher? Is not a philosopher doomed to impersonality and anonymity by being with others who still nurture a natural, cave-like attitude? Contrary to Rudi Visker's position, according to which "[p]hilosophy will always die in the cave, that it will remain powerless in the ruling domain of self-evident" (Visker 1999, 24), we advocate here the thesis that *philosophizing in the cave is not only possible, but necessary, in order to know what the cave actually is*. Unlike as in Plato, where it is true that one cannot within the cave find out what the cave is, because the world of sensory illusion receives its name only after getting to know the true reality of ideas, Husserl does not acknowledge the conflict between illusions, images, fiction, and essential contents. A phenomenological caveman simply must not leave the world of shadows to get records of them.

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It is indisputable that most people are completely satisfied in the world of shadows. A permanent focus on the lowest level of reality is not a sufficient motive for the search for something different. Heidegger's idiom also applies to Husserl: we are all cavemen of the natural attitude, first of all and most of the time (*zunächst und zumeist*). We do not have an innate *a priori* of the higher and better world, because if we had it, we would all be philosophers, or at least try to become ones. If a permanent stay in the existing world is acceptable to the vast majority, individuals are still looking for something else. According to Hans Blumenberg, the motive should be sought in the exhaustion of the empty, illusory, and superficial reality of moving images, and not in the enthusiastic need for the better: "Development is not a secret longing for something higher;

it is the overcoming of difficulties, which the lower creates itself and which can no longer solve with its means. Dynamism arises from exhaustion [...]” (Blumenberg 1996, 64.)

Certainly: the one who has confidence in the sensory world, feels safe and secure in it, will not follow the path of a philosopher. There must be a crisis of security. Our future philosopher should express an uncanniness in the surrounding visual world. He starts with a dissatisfaction with parasitic existence in scenes that are prepared from beginning to end in the exterior about which we know nothing.

### **Destruction of habit-based existence**

24

Although Plato’s allegory was conceived as being timeless, Husserl’s version takes place in a specific historical period. Drafts of phenomenological reduction were sketched at a time when the sense of existential security was not domesticated. On the contrary, the prevalence of a radical effort to destroy all certainties, to question everything, is perhaps most recognizable in Husserl’s countryman, Franz Kafka. For a lawyer, whose career was tied to working in an insurance company, the degree of our sense of security is identical to the degree of our stupidity. Thus, his most famous work *The Process* “narrates the destruction of existence based on habits” (Gliksohn 1971, 61). Helmuth Plessner’s impression during his stay with Husserl in Göttingen also did not fail to notice that “the epoch of security should come to an end” (Plessner 1985, 351). The historic situation, in which Husserl found himself, was “cave-like,” because enthusiasm and inexhaustible work ethic were necessary for the time, but, instead, he found only exhaustion and fatigue in the surrounding world.

Perhaps unexpectedly, the war lectures on *Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity* (1917) also brought a dramatic sketch of the endangered subjectivity. According to war psychosis, the lecturer presented the philosophy he teaches as “the only way to salvation.” The real existential fear of general endangerment and the first encounter with a total-war slaughterhouse were translated into the standards of the Platonic–Christian conflict. This was a dispute between a deadly devotion to the senses that betray us and a saving mind, a magic

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of enjoying the world and a healing collective devotion to the spiritual life. Together with the effects of encouraging rhetoric of the battlefield, which above all appreciated the “heroic decision” and was unusually familiar to the listeners, Husserl stylizes the phenomenological hero. Who started the war, who is to blame and responsible for it, was completely irrelevant, only the possible, that is the desirable outcome was calculated: the miraculous birth of a new type of humanity.

### **The phenomenologist leaves the cave by remaining in it**

The old type of humanity is incurably ill, it suffers from the alleged “affect of being.” However, the reevaluation of Fichte’s ontological-existential notion had nothing to do with the new image of human bliss. However, one simply cannot overlook the sermonic tone, in which Husserl addresses his audience—German soldiers on leave, many of whom were shocked and traumatized by witnessing unprecedented massacres, such as the battles at the Somme and of Verdun. To the well-known and even old-fashioned opposition between the seductively sensual and the spiritually saving, Husserl adds another, a new one, a more contemporary opposition of distracted–focused, that is, disoriented–oriented:

25

As long as man gives up on himself in the pain of the sensual lusts of the diversity of earthly things, he necessarily lives a scattered, to some extent a poured-out existence. The distraction of the unhappy sensual man is transformed through rebirth into the concentration of a new spiritual man. (Husserl 1989a, 280.)

There is no place for fatigue during the war. It is not yet allowed in public speech; Husserl mentions it only in his later works, however not as a reality, but as a danger, even the “greatest danger.” Years before Kracauer and Benjamin, the founder of phenomenology introduced the term *Zerstreuung*, which has been considered to this day as one of the most present and most general signs of contemporary subjectivity. However, unlike his fellow Berlin and Frankfurt journalists, for whom *Zerstreuung* was a direct consequence of the

“experiential poverty” caused by the new media montage and the means of film and newspaper assembly editing, for the phenomenologist *die Zerstreung* was the insight of subjectivists shaped by scientific ideals.

Namely, Husserl’s metaphor of the “poured-out” (*ausgegossen*) subjectivity should be taken seriously. The poured-out subject is lost in naturalistic objectifications; thus, it happens to them that they advocate the thesis that there is blood as a consequence of soil, “German blood,” which firstly opposed the “French” and “Russian” or later the “Jewish blood.” At the same time, they forget that there are only O, A, and B blood groups with positive and negative rhesus factors. A phenomenologist cannot be indifferent to the dominance of such a way of thinking. Namely, where naturalism reigns, scientific ideals that are contrary to fundamental phenomenological premises are at work.

26 Instead of exploring subjectivity, naturalism prefers to ignore and forget personal life in the world. Phenomenological idealism also calls for protest, because *naturalism is another word for a complete denial of the absolute and undeniable primacy of the spirit over nature*. The title of the paragraph 64 of *Ideas II* simply states: “Relativity of nature, absoluteness of spirit,” and thus undoubtedly claims dependence and subordination of every natural being to the spiritual:

[...] if we could eliminate all spirits from the world, then that is the end of nature. But if we eliminate nature, “true,” objective-intersubjective existence, there always still remains something: the spirit as individual spirit. It only loses the possibility of sociality. (Husserl 1989b, 311.)

The struggle against objectivism is also a struggle for the dignity of the individual. Where subjectivity is not explored and where it becomes unimportant, the inevitable consequence is that man becomes treated as a thing among other things (Guenaracia 2018, 201).

Husserl was among the first to recognize the danger of the unhappy coalition between scientism and Nazism. A naturalized politician is able to carry out self-evident, natural socialization. It is inevitably based on selection, on separating the compatriots from the foreigners, the healthy from the sick, the sexually correct from the sexually delinquent. This can be illustrated by

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means of the extremely unusual concept of democracy, advocated by Carl Schmitt: “Democracy therefore necessarily requires firstly homogeneity and secondly—if necessary—the elimination and destruction of heterogeneity.” (Schmitt 1932, 14.) The natural community substantiates the individual; it acquires unchanging “real” essence, eternal properties, core characteristics of the utmost importance. It becomes subject to natural causality, like all other natural beings. Husserl dismissed all those moments as “nonsense” of naturalism: “that is the pure absurdity, no better if one wanted to ask about the casual properties, connections, etc. of numbers. It is the absurdity of naturalizing something whose essence excludes the kind of being that nature has.” (Husserl 1965, 106–107.) Scientism has no dilemmas; based on the notion of unchanging human nature, different types are deduced, i.e., race, subspecies, or nations. Racial institutes, founded all over the Western Europe, showed the perfect harmony of naturalism and Nazi-like political agendas. As a result, science was put in the function of political madness. The common goal of their existence and work was to prove that they are not all the same, that there are more valuable, “original” races (*Wurzelrassen*) and that there are the less valuable ones. The eugenics project began in 1890, first in England and Germany, then in the United States and Scandinavia.

27

Following Husserl, the philosopher is forced to “take it upon himself to act as a denaturalized politician” (Vlaisavljević 2015, 49). The philosophical politician questions Trần Đức Thảo’s thesis that the transcendental ego is not a real historical human (Tran-Duc-Thao 1951, 217), because even if they were not, all the material of conscious experiences that would be the subject of their reflection would inevitably be historically determined. *Husserl’s phenomenologist leaves the cave by, paradoxically, remaining in it, but no longer shares the beliefs of their silent, inactive neighbors.* The double subjectivity is a consequence of phenomenological reduction: “phenomenological reduction makes manifest a subject that, on the one hand, clings to the world and, on the other, turns away from it” (Bernet 1994, 247).

The phenomenological cavemen certainly always acquire their orientation in contact with contingent factual experiences. Unlike the naturalistic attachment of their fellow citizens, the phenomenological inhabitants of the cave will reflect on the degree of justification of their beliefs, but at the same

time they will come out of their individuality. Their individual egos will vary in accordance with the countless variations of themselves that are opened by the temptation of otherness. In order to get rid of the cave limitations, it is not necessary that we leave the cave environment. It is enough to change our attitude. By practicing indulgence, we can also emancipate ourselves by “experiencing” the dishonesty of others. This experience will teach us that the structure of otherness is again twofold: on the one hand, the other is the individual, and, on the other, there are many others. Others are not originally close as objects of special intentionality. They are present and function in every intentionality, because “I” came to the other through introspection. If Descartes could say: “I think, then God is,” then Husserl’s version should certainly be: “I think, so others are.” This brings us to the culmination of Husserl’s implicit policy. It examines the intersubjective constitution of the subject, including theories of strangeness and otherness. The rationality of phenomenological politics becomes evident by recognizing others in oneself. Its peaceful assumption rests on recognizing others, even strangers, as variations of oneself. The capacity to acquire enemies is largely neutralized by such an approach.

28

Being sensitive towards grasping other attitudes does not mean expressing the emphatic understanding and friendly support for each and every standpoint. It rather helps to understand the genealogical becoming of a certain way of thinking and doing, including the radical ones. For that reason, a phenomenologist would easily resist the temptation of essentializing the enemy. Quite apart from all the phenomenological hermeneutics, there is a starting methodological point, which excludes our existing prejudices about others: “At no time should the alter ego be explicitly or implicitly presupposed.” (Franck 1981, 90.) One of the inevitable outcomes of the phenomenological reduction should be stepping on the unfamiliar soil of new forms of socialization.

Plato’s caveman was at home in his autochthonic natural community. The one who dares leaving the cave is going to face the fact that, despite all educational interventions and efforts, “the prospects for human improvement seem bleak [...] The demand to help all, to benefit all, is an unreasonable hope, given human limitations.” (McBrayer 2019, 262–263.) On the other hand, being a phenomenologist means going through a series of identity crises. It begins with neutralization of, or even conflict with, the logic of natural

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socialization. Total questioning erases all security, opening the possibility of spirituality and sociality that are no longer parasitic and implicit, but reflexive, based on the experience of the stranger as another self. In Husserl's cave, the discovery of another self does not arise from the experience of the outside, but is a consequence of *inspectio sui*. Instead of a safe haven, the phenomenological caveman perceives only uncertainty. Freeing oneself from natural socialization enables the constitution of others through the category of the possible: "The a priori other is the very existence of the possibility in general." (Deleuze 1969, 369.) The possibility, thus, turns out to be the key word and the key experience of sociality in the Husserlian cave. In it, one may encounter myriad variations of self/other configurations, but none of the enemy.

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ISBN 978-961-7014-40-2



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